南非《邮政卫报》：美国人眼里的非洲
南非《邮政卫报》：美国人眼里的非洲
大能猫翻译
http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=242892&area=/insight/insight__africa/
尼克·道斯(Nic Dawes)
2005年6月10日 09:00
让达伊·弗雷泽(Jendayi Frazer)被提名为下任负责非洲事务的助理国务卿。(照片提供: 保罗·波迪Paul Botes)
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美国非洲政策的主要战略考虑是什麽？
首先，非洲是我们全球战略的一部分；不能孤立地来看。非洲并没有被视为一个人权特区。我们对非洲的利益，和我们在其他地区的利益一样：这是一个主流的政策。
其次，有很多对前911政策和后911政策的议论，但坦白讲，我们的非洲政策有很大的连续性，这个政策是基于总统的全球战略的，是为了世界更安全，更美好。
对于安全，我们总是关注，大规模杀伤性武器，反恐，暴政。对于美好，就是经济议程，自由贸易议程，健康和教育。这两个目标，保证了政策的连续性，构成了我们的非洲政策。
非洲的政府非常关心援助被整合到长期计划里去。[英国财政大臣]戈登·布朗(Gordon Brown)提议成立 国际金融机构(international finance facility)[IFF]。美国的世纪挑战账户(Millennium Challenge Account)[MCA]也是处理这些问题的吗？
我们不能支持IFF因为需要筹集长期债券，我们的预算是年度执行的。IFF还在讨论之中，而我们的计划已经开始实行了。我们已经启动了MCA。
获得MCA援助的条件是政府来申请，制定受助国的长期计划；它是一个合同。他们必须报告我们如何使用这笔钱。
八国峰会有什麽实质性内容吗？八国的观点不统一，八国应该首先协调立场吗？
八国峰会有很多实质内容。首先，支援非洲委员会的报告仅仅是个报告。
八国峰会已经把非洲行动计划放在了合适的位置。支援非洲委员会不是八国会谈的主要内容。
但是也有我们需要很作的领域：例如，减债：我们需要达成协议。我想我们，尤其是美国和英国，同意100%减免债务。
我们应当给与授权[通过世界银行的国际开发署],不再安排贷款，非洲国家应该理解第一点，因为贷款人已经无法偿还贷款了。
为什麽我们不能在八国峰会这样做呢？这是会是非洲受益的结构改革。
为什麽我们不能在八国峰会减免100%的农业补贴呢？我们需要认真考虑我们的责任。
我们怎样援助地区维和行动呢？过去在非洲四五次行动，我们抢着援助他们。
为什麽非洲发展银行不能改革，增加援助，来进行Nepad [非洲发展新伙伴计划]，帮助管理和建设基础设施呢？这些改变将是长远的，而不是随意地说些“我们需要250亿”这样的话。
非洲人也想在象世界银行这样的多边机构的改革中发出更多的声音。
我理解在管理国际机构中发出更大声音的愿望。坦白讲，美国被代表的也不够。如果基于我们的经济份额来分配，我们在国际货币组织的代表权，也被削弱了，因此我代表了一个被削弱的选区[笑]。一些欧洲国家应该占有更少的份额——他们的经济收缩了——美国应该占有更大的份额，可能一些发展中国家应该占有更大的份额。我很同情；但不知道该怎麽办。
你对中国在非洲影响力的扩大有什麽看法？
我认为美国没有对中国在非洲的影响制定任何政策。也许随着时间的推移，我们会制定一个。当然我们看到中国在苏丹扮演了一个角色。中国在津巴布韦也有利益。因此就有一个中国将会在非洲扮演什麽角色的问题，中国会破坏大国在非洲的平衡吗？
我们应该鼓励他们，非洲政府也应该鼓励他们，因为好的管理是很重要的。
另一个问题自然就是贸易关系问题。中国正在发展外向经济；我们也在使非洲变为由价值的出口区。关键是看中国如何做？当然中国需要遵守国际贸易准则。
我可以鼓励他们。如果他们被邀请到八国峰会，我们会讨论这些问题。
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American eye on Africa
Nic Dawes
http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=242892&area=/insight/insight__africa/
10 June 2005 09:00
Jendayi Frazer is tipped to be the next assistant secretary of state for Africa. (Photograph: Paul Botes)
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What are the primary strategic considerations driving American policy on Africa?
Firstly, Africa is part of our global strategy; it is not separate and distinct. Africa is not treated as an area for humanitarian interest. We are interested in Africa just as we are interested in any other area: it is a mainstream policy.
Secondly, there is lot of discussion of pre 9-11, post 9-11 policy, but frankly there is tremendous continuity in our Africa policy, and it is based on the president’s global para-digm, which is to make the world safer, and to make the world better.
On the safer side that was always a focus on weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism and tyranny. On the better side, it was an economic agenda, a free trade agenda, health and education. Those two overarching objectives continue, and frame up our Africa policy.
One of the key concerns of African governments has been to integrate Aid flows into long-term planning. The international finance facility [IFF] proposed by [British Finance Minister] Gordon Brown tries to address that. Does the United States’s Millennium Challenge Account [MCA] deal with that problem?
We can’t do the IFF because it commits funding in the future, and our budgetary process is annual. The IFF is still a proposal that is being discussed, what we’ve said is that those who’ve said they can do it should start doing it immediately. And we’ve started with the MCA immediately.
In terms of helping countries with multi-year planning, the approach of the MCA is country ownership; it is a compact, and some of the reason for the slowness is the countries have to write their compact. They have to tell us how they want to use the money. We will focus that money in their areas of priority. It has built in acknowledgement of the need for country ownership and accountability.
Can anything concrete come out of the G8 summit, given these kinds of differences, or should countries get on with their own initiatives?
A lot can come out of the G8 process. First of all the Commission for Africa report is just that, a report.
The G8 process has already had the Africa Action Plan in place. The Commission for Africa is not the basis for the conversation at the G8.
But there are areas where we should work together. For instance, debt relief: we are probably at the point where we should conclude an agreement. I think we are close, particularly the US and Britain, to agreement on 100% debt cancellation.
We should also give grants [through the International Development Agency of the World Bank], no more loans, and African countries should support this, because the recipients can’t pay back the loans.
Why can’t we do that at the G8? That would be an immediate structural reform that would benefit Africa.
Why can’t we as the G8 agree to the elimination of 100% of agricultural subsidies? That is something we should commit ourselves to seriously.
How do we finance regional peacekeeping operations? The past four or five [missions] have been African countries going in the lead, and we scramble around to finance them.
Why can’t the African Development Bank reform and increase financing so it can be the mechanism for operationalising the Nepad [New Partnership for Africa’s Development] vision on governance and infrastructure? Those are the structural changes that would be long lasting; it’s not the arbitrary “we need 25-billion by 20 something or other” approach.
Africans also want reform at other multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and, not least of all, more of a voice.
I understand the desire for greater voice in terms of governance in international institutions. Frankly, the US is under-represented. If you base it on the share of our economy, we are under-represented in the International Monetary Fund, so I represent an under represented constituency there [laughs]. Some of the European countries should have less of a share — their economies have actually shrunk — the US should have more of a share, and probably some developing countries should have more of a share. I am sympathetic; I don’t know where it will go.
Do you have a view on the expanding role of China in Africa?
I don’t think the US has any policy vis-à-vis China’s role in Africa. Maybe over time we’ll develop one. Certainly we saw that China played a role in Sudan, and not a very positive role, in terms of trying to get oil out, and allowing the government to continue with atrocities toward the south. There are issues relating to China in Zimbabwe. So it is a question of how will China play on the governance issues. Will it buy the Monterey Consensus that the other major economies have set up as a mutually agreed relationship with African countries?
We should encourage them, and African governments should encourage them, because good governance is absolutely essential.
Another area is on the nature of the trade relationship. China is looking at extractive industries; we are trying to move Africa toward value-added exports. So how will China transform? Certainly China needs to be a good corporate citizen and sign up to international standards.
We can encourage them. And if they are invited to the G8, we should make that an issue.
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